Pre?modern, Modern and Post?modern Famine in Iraq by Gazdar, Haris
1 Famine conditions in Iraq since
the 1990s
The UN Security Council imposed economic
sanctions against Iraq in August 1990 in response to
Iraq’s military invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions
banned all trade with Iraq, virtually isolating its
economy from the rest of the world. There was a
limited lifeline through Jordan, but this was a mere
trickle compared with Iraq’s historical dependence
on foreign trade for its basic sustenance. Prior to the
imposition of sanctions 60–85 per cent of Iraq’s food
consumption used to be imported, and the export
sector accounted for up to 90 per cent of the GDP.
Tested against current standards of economic
liberalisation, the Iraq of 1990 was not a market-
friendly economy: there were internal restrictions,
state controls and a war-oriented command system.
But at the same time, Iraq’s economy was not
autarkic. It was highly dependent on international
trade, and Iraq was ahead of the pack in terms of
its interaction with global markets. An
understanding of the impact of sanctions against
Iraq, therefore, can provide a glimpse of what to
expect from external shocks to a national economy
within a globally integrating market system.
It was suspected from the outset that Iraq would
face severe food shortages as a result of the
sanctions. A country that had relied heavily on
food imports had been virtually cut off from the
rest of the world. Iraq has, indeed, faced famine
conditions since 1990. There have been dramatic
declines in food availability and consumption, and
there have dramatic increases in mortality rates.
The number of excess deaths due to non-combat
causes during this period has been estimated at
anywhere between 200,000 and 1 million people.
The sanctions and their impact on the population
of Iraq have been sources of political controversy
from the very outset. The governments of the USA
and Britain have interpreted comments on the
humanitarian impact of sanctions as political
opposition to their policy on Iraq. For a number of
years now, however, humanitarian agencies have
been united in declaring their concern about
conditions in the country.
It was only in 1999, almost a decade after the
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conducted a large-scale statistical survey of the
country. A study by UNICEF found that the under-5
child mortality rate had increased from 56 to 131 per
thousand since the imposition of sanctions. This
meant 75 extra deaths per thousand children and, at
a very conservative estimate, around half a million
extra deaths among children between 1991 and
1999. Given the fact that prior to 1990 there had
been a declining trend in mortality rates – a trend
that might have continued – the real magnitude of
excess mortality was likely to have been even higher.1
The Iraqi famine, however, is the result only
partially of ‘food availability’ or even ‘food
entitlement’ failures. Rather, following Sen’s
typologies, the Iraqi famine is substantially about
‘capability’ failure.2 ‘Pre-modern’ famine refers to
the breakdown of modern administrative and
market institutions, leading to a sharp decline in
local food availability. Situations where food
entitlement failures occur within the context of
functioning modern institutions have been labelled
as ‘modern’ famine. ‘Post-modern’ famine refers to
excess mortality in spite of protected food
entitlements but due to non-food crises: notably, the
stresses of macro shocks on relatively sophisticated
health and social welfare systems. Iraq represents
one of the most disastrous examples of the famine
of the future – where essentially policy-induced
macroeconomic shocks in a globally integrated
economy can lead to dramatic increases in mortality
over sustained periods of time.
2 Functioning modern economy
and government
Pre-sanctions Iraq was a country of untargeted food
subsidies. The government subsidised the prices of
most imported commodities, including food,
through the partial maintenance of a highly
overvalued exchange rate. While the import of
most other commodities faced quantitative
restrictions, which were administered through the
regulated issue of import licences, the government
itself was the main importer of staple food items
such as wheat-flour. The subsidy was administered
by the Ministry of Trade, through its monopolistic
control of food imports.
In August 1990, the untargeted general subsidy on
wheat-flour was replaced with a ration system.
Wheat-flour and other food items were still
subsidised, but the government relinquished its
monopoly over the import of food and allowed the
private sector to import food at the market
exchange rate. Subsidised food was now available
in limited quantities through the government
ration system. From August 1990 onwards,
therefore, there was a dual market for staple foods
– one with highly subsidised prices and rationed
quantities, and the other an unregulated open
market. Much of the Iraqi population has
continued to rely on a combination of these two
sources of food since then.
The food ration system was organised quickly to
replace the generalised price subsidy. The fact that
this system was controlled by the Ministry of Trade
emphasised its origins in the generalised import
price subsidy of the pre-sanctions period. The
system has functioned efficiently, and its operation
has been improved over time. It was supported by
an efficiently managed food procurement system.
The ration system was supplemented with a well-
functioning market for imported food. There have
been restrictions and regulations, particularly those
relating to the ability of local farmers to sell staple
foods in the open market, but by and large the
market system has worked without too much
government interference.
Iraq presents the case of a government and market
economy that have functioned effectively internally,
despite facing severe external military, political and
economic pressures. Perhaps even more
surprisingly, the government and market systems
as they relate to food have functioned without
undue interference or predation from a ruling elite
that has otherwise proven itself to be both intrusive
and predatory. It is in the context of modern and
effective governmental and market systems that
Iraq has witnessed dramatic increases in mortality.
The Iraqi crisis, therefore, is quite unlike other
famines of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, which have been associated with
breakdowns in administrative and market systems.
Even though its origins are to be found in war, the
Iraqi crisis is structurally similar to the crises in
countries such as Argentina, Indonesia and Russia
which have experienced macroeconomic free-fall
leading to dramatic increases in poverty, morbidity
and excess mortality.
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3 Three phases of the sanctions
The sanctions regime can be divided, broadly, into
three phases: (1) August 1990 to March 1991 –
total ban on imports and exports; (2) April 1991 to
December 1996 – total ban on exports, but
exemption of food, medicines and designated
humanitarian supplies from the import ban; and
(3) January 1997 till now – ‘food-for-oil’
agreements allowing Iraq to export oil in return for
restricted imports of designated humanitarian
supplies.
From August 1990 until April 1991, there was a
strictly enforced total ban on all external trade. Iraq
was not allowed to import or export anything, with
the exception of a small trickle of trade with Jordan
– an exemption agreed by the UN Security Council
to gain Jordan’s compliance with the overall aims of
the sanctions.
The war between Iraq and the American-led
coalition began in January 1991 and ended in
March. There were large-scale rebellions in the
north and the south of the country that took the
shape of a civil war. Foreign military intervention
in the north led to the creation of a Kurdish
enclave, while in the south the civil rebellion and
conscript mutiny were brutally suppressed by the
Iraqi regime. Towards the end of March, some
semblance of order had been restored to the entire
country – with the northern part achieving partial
autonomy from Baghdad, and the southern part
having been militarily ‘pacified’. Pockets of
resistance continued for some time in the southern
marshes for some time thereafter, but these did not
present a major threat to the military and civil
order of the main population centres.
In March and April 1991, there were several
missions into Iraq for the assessment of
humanitarian conditions. These included two
influential UN-led missions, which reported to the
Secretary-General. There were also new UN Security
Council resolutions that led to a modification of the
sanctions regime. The main change was that Iraq
was now allowed to import food and medicines and
other designated humanitarian supplies.
The new resolutions also included a provision for
export exemptions in order to allow Iraq to regain
the ability to pay for essential imports.
Negotiations on these ‘food-for-oil’ (FFO)
arrangements remained stalled for several years,
until 1996, when Iraq and the UN finally agreed on
a FFO deal, which once again modified the
sanctions regime. The original FFO was highly
restrictive, in terms of both the value of oil that Iraq
was allowed to export, as well as the procedures for
approving imports financed by the foreign
exchange thus earned. Subsequent negotiations led
to some loosening on both counts, with the result
that Iraqi exports reached the limits of the country’s
productive capacity.
4 The ration system and the
market under sanctions
The ration system and the open market have
functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness,
since August 1990, in meeting the food needs of
the Iraqi people. The ration system has been well
organised and its coverage in government-
controlled areas has been widespread. However,
the extent to which the ration system actually met
the population’s food needs varied from time to
time, depending on the economic resources
available to the government. In 1991, for example,
the ration provided the equivalent of around 1,400
kcal per person per day. By 1996, six years into the
sanctions, the caloric value had dropped to around
1,200 kcal. These two amounts represented,
respectively, around two-thirds and three-fifths of
recommended minimum requirements. Since the
FFO agreements in 1996 and their successive
liberalisation since, the amount of food available
through the ration has increased to cover basic
minimal nutritional requirements.
The open market has existed alongside the ration
system. The benchmark prices for staple foods in
the market are set close to the cost of importing
these foods from neighbouring countries, using the
unofficial exchange rate, which varies according to
anticipated changes in Iraq’s external economic
environment. There has been an inflationary
tendency in Iraq since 1991, when the government
began raising nominal wages of public sector
employees by resorting to monetary expansion.
The value of the currency declined to historically
low levels in 1995, resulting in historically high
open market dinar prices. Since the FFO, the open
market exchange rate for the Iraqi dinar has
65
fluctuated in response to perceptions of the
outlook for economic reintegration with the
outside world. Improvements in the value of the
dinar led to lower relative prices for food.
The market has been relatively robust and efficient.
Transport and communication between different
parts of government-controlled Iraq have
functioned well, and market prices in various
population centres have fluctuated within narrow
margins. On the other hand, the market has
provided food security to the Iraqi people only to
the extent that there is purchasing power, which in
turn has depended upon the macroeconomic
scenario.
5 ‘Pre-modern’ famine: food
availability crises
There have been crucial periods and places in Iraq
where the modern administrative and market
systems broke down, leading to food availability
crises. One such period was around January to
March 1991, during which there was excess
mortality directly resulting from combat, but also
due to the widespread disruption of existing
systems caused by the war and civil conflict. There
were refugee crises in both the northern and
southern parts of the country. Public as well as
private systems of food delivery broke down.
During this period, conditions of ‘pre-modern’,
food availability-driven famine existed over large
parts of Iraq. There were reports of hunger and
starvation, of people reducing their number of
meals or subsisting on simple staples alone, or even
relying on famine foods such as edible matter in
reed stalks.
Those regions where the war and civil conflict were
particularly severe also experienced greater
hardship in food availability. The Kurdish areas of
northern Iraq already had a long history of military
repression and economic disruption. Similar
conditions prevailed over large parts of the south.
Order was restored, however, through brutal
military action in which many civilians were killed
and injured. The re-establishment of government
control was quickly followed by the resumption of
the food ration system and the restoration of the
market.
6 ‘Modern’ famine: food
entitlement failures
War and civil conflict caused acute food availability
crises across the country in general, and in areas of
fighting, such as the north and the south in
particular. For most of the time, and over much of
the country however, government and market
systems of food delivery have functioned relatively
well in the period since August 1990. In the early
part of the sanctions period the government relied
quite heavily on the stockpiles of food that had
been accumulated in anticipation of the crisis. As
the sanctions wore on, the ability of the
government to sustain the ration system came
under increasing stress.
From 1991 onwards, there were attempts to revive
the agricultural sector that had suffered a decade of
neglect during the Iran–Iraq war. There were
strong economic incentives for people to return to
farming, and to some extent the efforts of the
government were rewarded. There was an increase
in the number of people employed in the
agricultural sector, increases in farmed area, and
some increase in domestic food output.
Economic conditions continued to decline
however, and this was reflected in small declines in
the amount of the food ration. Real wages had
fallen dramatically – by a margin of around 90 per
cent between 1990 and 1991 – and they fell again,
by around 40–50 per cent of their 1991 values, up
to 1996. In 1996 the purchasing power of an Iraqi
office worker, for example, had declined to just
around 2–3 per cent of its 1990 value. Government
transfers in the shape of the subsidised monthly
ration, which was available at nominal prices,
amounted to around three-quarters of the
purchasing power of the office worker’s family. The
collapse in the real value of private incomes meant
that the food entitlements of ordinary Iraqis were
dependent on the ration system, and the ration
system provided only partial protection against
hunger.
It can be argued that the protection provided by the
state ration was instrumental in preventing the
onset of mass starvation in Iraq. Six years after the
sanctions had been imposed, and five years after
the end of the war, however, even this system was
under severe stress. The war and civil conflict in
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early 1991 was a period of serious hardship for
most people. The restoration of administrative and
market systems after this period had led to the
alleviation of local food availability crises. By 1996
however, the government of Iraq as well as the
private household economy were close to breaking
point once again.
The government had held out against the ‘food-for-
oil’ deal for many years, in the vain hope that
sanctions might be lifted altogether. In 1996, faced
with an imminent macroeconomic meltdown, the
government of Iraq finally agreed to the terms of
FFO. This led to some immediate relief both in the
ration system – which was expanded – and in the




The FFO agreement was a provisional measure
aimed at allowing the provision of emergency
supplies to Iraq. In the initial years its scale and
operation were highly restrictive. Iraq was allowed
to export only a fraction of its productive capacity
and its import requests were subject to lengthy
bureaucratic – and allegedly politically motivated –
delays. Although the operation of the FFO was
somewhat liberalised over the years, its one
essential feature – that the government of Iraq does
not have access to Iraq’s export earnings – has
remained in place.
This implies that while Iraq is able to import
certain commodities, such as food, selected
medicines and other essential supplies, the FFO
deal prevents any significant revival of domestic
economic activity or the non-imported component
of public services. In other words, the FFO allows
for the importation of certain medicines, but does
not allow the Iraqi government to use Iraq’s export
revenues to retain the services of trained Iraqi
doctors or paramedics at remunerative salaries.
Even under the most benign conditions, the FFO
only allows Iraq to be run as a relatively efficient
refugee camp in which people get just about
enough food to eat. The people living in this
refugee camp are not allowed to import goods such
as spare parts and raw material supplies that might
be essential for running their enterprises. The
managers of the refugee camp, moreover, get
virtually no budget for hiring local people or
paying them a living wage.
The post-FFO scenario has led to anticipated
improvements in food availability and entitlements.
It has also thrown into relief, however, some of the
binding causes of excess mortality in Iraq that have
existed since August 1990. Iraq before 1990 was a
repressive but welfarist state where people enjoyed
high standards of nutrition, water supply, and
public health. The welfarist interventions of the
Iraqi state were responsible for notable
improvements in life expectancy and declines in
mortality. After August 1990 Iraq reverted to
conditions of poor nutrition, water supply and
public health. Successive changes in the sanctions
regime led to improvements in food entitlements.
But these improvements have not been sufficient to
lead to the restoration of a relatively sophisticated
urban economy and systems of public services.
The Iraqi people are relatively well fed now, after a
long period of malnutrition interspersed with acute
food availability crises, but they are still much
poorer and much less healthier than they might
have been under different sets of international and
national policies. Their poverty and ill-health is a
direct contributor to excess mortality.
8 The blame game
The successive sanctions regimes provide the
context for Iraq’s economic engagement with the
rest of the world. The period since August 1990
has seen drawn-out detailed negotiations between
the Iraqi government and the UN Security Council
over every minute change in the sanctions regime.
The formal objective of the sanctions is to secure
Iraq’s compliance with various resolutions of the
UN Security Council dealing with Iraq’s
demilitarisation. Both protagonists – the leading
members of the Security Council and the
government of Iraq – however, have treated the
debate about sanctions as a struggle over their
respective strategic goals, which have little to do
directly with the formal objectives of the Security
Council Resolutions. The government of Iraq’s
detractors in the Security Council have viewed the
sanctions as a way of keeping Iraq ‘in the box’,
while the Iraqi government’s positions have been
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geared to breaking its diplomatic, political and
economic isolation.
The common factor in this struggle over the
sanctions has been the attempt by the USA and its
allies to limit as much as possible the government of
Iraq’s access to the country’s actual and potential
export earnings. This is an extremely severe
condition, given that the state sector has historically
been the main mechanism through which primary
commodity producers have channelled export
earnings into the domestic economy.
The debate on sanctions has evolved into a ‘blame
game’ in which the two sides have well-established
positions absolving themselves of responsibility.
The typical position of Iraq’s detractors can be
stated in the following way:
The Iraqi government is repressive and cynical:
it could put an end to the sanctions by co-
operating with the UN Security Council, and
by using available resources for welfare. The
government uses civilian suffering for political
advantage.
The government of Iraq’s position, on the other
hand, can be summarised thus:
The powerful states that dominate the Security
Council have unstated and illegal political
objectives in isolating Iraq. The Security
Council resolutions are simply a convenient
cover, and Iraqi civilians are the real victims.
Both positions are simplistic and do no justice to
the political economy of sanctions. The Iraqi
government is repressive, but also welfare-
oriented, and the unstated political objectives of
world powers are not entirely autonomous of the
nature of the Iraqi government. The blame game is
disingenuous because it conceals the fact that the
prevention of excess mortality is not the primary
concern of either party to the conflict.
9 Beyond the blame game
The blame game also conveys the impression that
what has happened in Iraq is something quite
peculiar to the nature of conflict in the Gulf, and
that it has little bearing on humanitarian policy,
food security, and famine prevention elsewhere.
While it is true that there are aspects of the Iraqi
situation that are probably unique, it is worth
noting that some of the key features of the crisis in
Iraq are more widely applicable.
First, whatever the precise politics of the sanctions,
and whatever side one might want to take in the
‘blame game’, the sanctions are, substantively, a
severe macroeconomic shock. In particular, the
sanctions represent the policy-induced economic
isolation of a national economy from an otherwise
integrating world economy. Unilateral and
multilateral sanctions of various types affect a large
number of countries. Their effects on individual
countries are likely to be more severe the greater
the overall integration of the global economy. Even
a poor economy such as Afghanistan, which is,
nevertheless, integrated into the world economy
due to its dependence on remittances of migrant
workers, can be vulnerable to policy-induced
isolation such as restrictions on the operation of
the informal foreign exchange system. If the
tendency towards economic integration is
inevitable, so too is the increased vulnerability of
diverse economies to unilateral or multilateral acts
of ‘regulation’.
Second, the breakdown in relatively sophisticated
economic and public services systems can give rise
to dramatic increases in poverty, malnutrition,
morbidity and mortality. Countries which have
experienced improvements in economic and health
conditions, can revert back to higher rates of
malnutrition, morbidity and mortality in the face of
sustained macroeconomic shock and decline. In
these situations the quantum of excess mortality
can be very high precisely because the initial
conditions were relatively benign.
Third, unlike conspicuous food availability failures
or even entitlement failures, which tend to be
associated with natural disasters and wars, a ‘post-
modern’ famine could occur quietly as a result of
economic shock, and be revealed post hoc through
the analysis of demographic data (for an example,
see Garenne on Madagascar, in this Bulletin).
Other contributions in this volume have shown
that it is far too soon to write an epitaph for the
pre-modern and modern famines. Iraq, however,
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provides a gruesome glimpse of the famine of the
future – i.e. a famine in conditions where problems
of development and modernisation find
supposedly benign solutions in the shape of
functioning states and markets. Iraq was a well-
functioning (in terms of administrative functions)
state, closely integrated with the world economy
(through the export of oil) and with a domestic
economy that was well-integrated internally. On
the scale of modernisation Iraq was ahead of most
developing countries; indeed, many developing
countries would have regarded the modernisation
of countries such as Iraq as a benchmark to be
aspired to.
The excess mortality associated with the collapse of
Iraq’s economy and its welfare infrastructure is unique
only in its scale and in the persistence of the sanctions
regime. The economic collapse in Russia and its
attendant rise in mortality is comparable. The ‘post-
modern’ famine is not a chronologically determined
event. The conditions of the global economy imply
that ‘post-modern’ famine conditions will coexist with
‘pre-modern’ food availability crises as well as
‘modern’ famines due to entitlement failures. Even a
relatively unsophisticated economy such as
Afghanistan is sufficiently linked to global markets for
political levers such as sanctions to dramatically affect
the welfare of large numbers of people.
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Notes
* This article draws heavily upon Drèze and Gazdar
(1992), Gazdar and Hussain (2002), and Mahdi and
Gazdar (2002).
1. UNICEF (1999); see also Garfield (2000).
2. The ‘capabilities approach’ developed by Sen (1985)
and operationalised by Drèze and Sen (1989)
emphasises the role of non-food interventions,
particularly in public health, in reducing mortality
rates.
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